Duffy’s Trucking Fraud Crackdown Puts New Spotlight on Super Ego as TWOSU Records Reveal Conflicting Fleet Claims

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy on Monday announced one of the broadest federal enforcement initiatives yet aimed at fraud, shell companies, questionable CDL operations and criminal activity within portions of the commercial trucking industry, expanding the government’s focus far beyond the individual driver behind the wheel.

The initiative brings together the Department of Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Homeland Security Investigations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the FBI, DEA, ATF, federal prosecutors and state and local authorities. While much of the immediate attention has centered around CDL schools, improperly qualified drivers, immigration enforcement and English-language proficiency, the larger significance may be the government’s growing interest in the companies, financial relationships and corporate structures operating behind those drivers.

That broader federal focus comes as TWOSU News has been examining records tied to Floyd Inc. and the larger Super Ego network. Those records raise significant questions about how one company controlled by Aleksandar Mimic represented the size of its fleet when seeking commercial credit compared with the much smaller operation reflected in federal motor-carrier records.

A June 6, 2024 Hankook Tire America commercial credit application bearing Floyd Inc.‘s name represented a fleet of 2,600 commercial units, including 1,300 trucks and 1,300 trailers. The same credit packet requested an estimated $50,000 line of credit, projected approximately $120,000 in annual purchases and sought participation in Hankook’s National Fleet Account Program.

Federal motor-carrier records associated with Floyd, however, have reflected an operation dramatically smaller than 1,300 trucks. That discrepancy does not establish fraud by itself, nor does it prove that anybody intentionally supplied false information, but it creates a substantial question about whether Floyd represented the larger Super Ego network as part of its own commercial fleet when seeking credit, purchasing leverage or national-fleet benefits.

The issue becomes even more significant because Floyd is not an unrelated trucking company that simply happened to cross paths with Super Ego. In deposition testimony obtained and reviewed by TWOSU News, Aleksandar Mimic acknowledged that he owns both Floyd Inc. and Super Ego. The Hankook application separately identifies Mimic as Floyd’s President, CEO and owner, placing the same individual at the center of both operations.

That ownership connection creates several possible explanations for the 1,300-truck representation. Floyd may have been legitimately aggregating equipment belonging to Super Ego and other affiliated companies. Floyd may have owned or controlled a larger equipment pool that was operated under separate carrier authorities. Or the fleet figure may have overstated Floyd’s actual commercial footprint. Each possibility carries very different regulatory and legal consequences, and the records currently available do not allow any one of those explanations to be declared conclusive.

Duffy’s crackdown is moving beyond individual drivers

For much of the federal trucking enforcement debate over the past year, attention has centered around the qualifications of the individual driver. Commercial drivers licenses, English-language proficiency, immigration status, medical qualifications and improper testing practices have dominated both political discussion and regulatory enforcement.

Duffy’s Monday announcement significantly widens that lens.

FMCSA announced that more than 110 Entry-Level Driver Training providers were being removed from the federal Training Provider Registry after the schools were associated with more than 5,000 drivers who later failed roadside English-language-proficiency assessments. Federal investigators have also conducted hundreds of investigations across roughly 40 states, resulting in more than 160 additional proposed removals from the registry.

According to DOT, drivers certified through that additional group of providers have been linked to 239 commercial motor-vehicle fatalities. Federal officials are also launching a nationwide review of third-party CDL skills testers and the states responsible for overseeing those testing programs.

That examination carries significant consequences because FMCSA’s authority extends well beyond issuing warning letters. States that fail to maintain compliant CDL programs can potentially face the withholding of federal highway funds, and in the most severe circumstances federal regulators can begin decertification proceedings that could interfere with a state’s ability to issue, transfer, renew or upgrade commercial drivers licenses.

The larger message from Washington is that improperly qualified drivers are increasingly being treated as a symptom of a broader problem rather than an isolated roadside violation. Federal investigators are looking further upstream at the businesses, training systems, employers and corporate relationships that put those drivers behind the wheel.

HSI is targeting schools, carriers and employers

Homeland Security Investigations also announced a coordinated enforcement surge involving more than 200 driving schools across 23 states, with federal authorities serving inspection notices and opening investigations connected to commercial trucking businesses.

The scope is much broader than training facilities. Federal authorities have said investigators are examining employers, carriers and CDL-related businesses for possible unauthorized employment, identity and document fraud, financial crimes, money laundering, labor exploitation, shell companies, human smuggling, drug trafficking and potential cartel activity.

More than 1,000 leads involving CDL-related businesses have reportedly been generated for federal investigators, while dozens of inspection notices and multiple investigations have already been initiated. That represents a major departure from the traditional enforcement model where a roadside inspector identifies a driver violation, places the driver or truck out of service, writes the citation and effectively ends the inquiry.

The new approach asks a much larger series of questions. Investigators want to know who recruited the driver, who trained the driver, who arranged the employment, who owns or leases the tractor, who dispatches the freight, which company receives the money and who ultimately controls the operation.

For trucking networks built around numerous legal entities and multiple motor-carrier authorities, that distinction can be critical because the company attached to one DOT number may represent only a small piece of the larger enterprise.

A new federal trucking task force

The Department of Justice also announced the formation of the Joint Task Force Crossroads of America, initially bringing together federal prosecutors and law-enforcement agencies in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio.

Those four states sit in the middle of some of the most heavily traveled freight corridors in the United States. The task force combines U.S. Attorney’s Offices with FMCSA, FBI, DEA, Homeland Security Investigations, ICE, ATF and state and local agencies, creating an enforcement structure capable of looking at trucking activity from regulatory, immigration, financial and criminal perspectives at the same time.

Federal officials have also warned that some people exploiting weaknesses in the trucking system may be involved in transporting drugs, weapons or other contraband for international criminal organizations. More importantly for trucking companies, officials made clear that enforcement will not necessarily stop with the person sitting behind the steering wheel. Companies and individuals who knowingly enable unlawful activity are also part of the federal focus.

There is currently no public evidence establishing that Super Ego, Floyd Inc. or Aleksandar Mimic are targets of the newly announced federal task force, and TWOSU News is not reporting that they are. The significance is that the categories federal investigators are now discussing overlap with questions already surrounding Super Ego’s network of affiliated companies and the way those companies appear to divide equipment, drivers and operating authority.

The Hankook application provides a rare company-supplied fleet number

The Hankook documents are significant because they provide something difficult to obtain when examining a privately held trucking network: a number attributed directly to one of the companies describing the fleet it was presenting to a major commercial supplier.

The June 6, 2024 application identifies Floyd Inc. as the applicant and lists Aleksandar Mimic as President, CEO and owner. Floyd requested an estimated $50,000 commercial credit line and projected $120,000 in annual purchases.

In the fleet-profile section, Floyd represented 1,300 trucks and 1,300 trailers, for a total fleet size of 2,600 units.

That number was not published by an outside trade publication, former employee, social-media user or internet database. It appears inside a business credit packet attributed directly to Floyd.

The accompanying Hankook National Fleet Account Agreement is equally important because it contemplated Floyd acting not only on its own behalf but also as an agent for additional participating entities. The agreement represented that the National Fleet Account possessed authority to bind those participants to the agreement.

That language creates a potentially legitimate explanation for the larger fleet number. Floyd may have been seeking to purchase tires and administer a national fleet relationship for multiple affiliated companies, possibly including Super Ego carriers operating under different DOT authorities.

The copies reviewed by TWOSU News, however, do not include the separate Participants Addendum identifying those companies. That missing document could be one of the most important pieces of evidence in determining whether the 1,300 trucks actually represented an identifiable affiliated fleet or whether the number reflected something else entirely.

The agreement involved actual credit risk

The Hankook packet was not simply an application for a commercial discount. It contemplated an ongoing creditor relationship in which a national fleet customer could purchase tires through authorized dealers while Hankook directly invoiced the fleet account.

The agreement established standard billing terms where credit had been approved and required qualifying annual purchasing levels. Floyd’s application projected $120,000 in annual purchases, substantially above the program’s stated $50,000 target.

The paperwork also included provisions involving a continuing security interest, Uniform Commercial Code financing statements, default, nonpayment, insolvency, bankruptcy and a personal guaranty associated with an extension of credit.

Those provisions are important because they show why information about the applicant’s business and fleet would matter to Hankook. The supplier was potentially exposing itself to unpaid invoices and extending payment terms based upon an underwriting process intended to determine whether the applicant presented an acceptable commercial risk.

The fleet number therefore wasnt simply a statistic filling an empty box.

It was part of a financial picture.

Why 1,300 trucks matters during commercial underwriting

Commercial credit underwriting is fundamentally an assessment of risk and expected economic value. A supplier deciding whether to extend $50,000 in unsecured or partially secured commercial credit wants to know whether the applicant has the financial capacity, operating scale and expected business activity necessary to support that exposure.

Underwriters may examine financial statements, payment history, credit reports, business age, ownership, outstanding debt, expected purchases, collateral and the nature of the applicant’s operations. Fleet size can become one part of that overall assessment because a large fleet represents both economic capacity and future purchasing demand.

A carrier operating 1,300 tractors presents a fundamentally different commercial profile than a company operating one or two trucks. A 1,300-truck fleet could reasonably be expected to consume far more tires, generate more replacement purchases and produce considerably more recurring revenue for a supplier.

That creates both a risk side and a reward side for the creditor.

On the risk side, a company presenting itself as operating 1,300 trucks may appear to possess a substantial revenue-producing operation capable of supporting a $50,000 credit line. On the reward side, that same fleet suggests significant future purchasing volume, potentially making the customer much more commercially valuable to Hankook.

The combination of the represented fleet size, projected $120,000 in annual purchases and relatively modest $50,000 credit request could potentially make the requested exposure appear reasonable in comparison with the apparent size of the operation.

That does not mean Hankook simply looked at the number “1,300” and approved an account.

But it explains why the accuracy of that number potentially matters.

If the 1,300-truck figure was legitimate, Floyd may have been accurately representing the combined purchasing power of a larger affiliated network.

If the number was knowingly inflated, however, it could have caused an underwriter to evaluate a business substantially larger and potentially more creditworthy than the company actually seeking the credit.

That is where an inaccurate business representation can become more than poor paperwork.

A false number can distort the entire underwriting picture

Commercial underwriting does not necessarily depend upon one representation standing alone. The creditor builds a risk profile from multiple pieces of information supplied by the applicant and obtained from outside sources.

That means a materially false representation can be important even if no single underwriter later says the credit was approved solely because of that number.

An inflated fleet figure could potentially distort the perceived scale of the applicant, the expected purchasing volume, the commercial value of the account, the apparent ability to generate revenue, the appropriateness of the requested credit limit and the expected longevity of the customer relationship.

For example, a one-truck carrier asking for $50,000 in open commercial credit might appear significantly more risky than a 1,300-truck fleet asking for the same amount. The amount of credit is identical, but the business supposedly standing behind the obligation is completely different.

That is why the difference between Floyd’s federal carrier footprint and the commercial fleet representation deserves more than a passing mention.

The question is not simply whether one database contained a different number.

The question is whether Hankook was presented with a materially different picture of the business while deciding whether to expose itself financially.

If the number was knowingly inflated, potential criminal law enters the picture

An incorrect fleet number does not automatically constitute fraud. Neither does a large discrepancy between two documents.

For conduct involving the Hankook application to become criminal, investigators would need evidence showing considerably more. They would need to determine whether the fleet representation was false, whether the person responsible knew it was false, whether the information was material to Hankook’s financial decision and whether it was used with an intent to obtain money, property, goods, credit, pricing or another economic benefit.

If those facts were established, potential state and federal criminal theories could emerge.

Floyd was an Illinois corporation conducting business from Illinois, making Illinois deceptive-practices and theft laws potentially relevant depending upon where the conduct occurred and what Hankook ultimately did.

Illinois law addresses deceptive conduct undertaken with an intent to defraud, including certain circumstances where deception causes another person to execute a document creating a financial obligation. Illinois theft law also addresses obtaining property through deception.

Those statutes would not be triggered merely because the fleet numbers were different. Prosecutors would have to prove the required intent and establish what financial benefit or property was actually obtained.

But if evidence showed that a materially inflated fleet representation was knowingly used to make Floyd appear larger or more creditworthy so Hankook would extend credit or enter a financial arrangement it otherwise would not have accepted, investigators could examine whether the conduct crossed from inaccurate disclosure into criminal deception.

Federal mail or wire fraud could also become relevant

Federal law presents another potential path if investigators could establish both fraudulent intent and the required interstate communication.

Federal wire fraud generally involves a deliberate scheme to obtain money or property through materially false or fraudulent representations combined with the use of interstate electronic communications to further that scheme. Mail fraud works under a similar framework when the mail is used.

That means the method by which Floyd’s application reached Hankook could become important.

If a materially false application was knowingly emailed, uploaded through an electronic system or otherwise transmitted interstate as part of a deliberate plan to obtain credit, merchandise or preferential commercial terms, federal investigators could examine whether mail or wire fraud statutes apply.

Again, a false number by itself is not wire fraud. A mistake isnt wire fraud. A disputed interpretation of what constitutes a “fleet” isnt wire fraud either.

The potential criminal theory requires evidence of a scheme and fraudulent intent.

The Hankook paperwork is significant because, if the other elements were eventually established, the documents already identify the economic benefit being sought: commercial credit, national fleet status, purchasing privileges and an ongoing supplier relationship.

Federal records show a radically smaller motor-carrier operation

The commercial credit issue is only one side of the story.

Floyd operates under USDOT 2903977, and its FMCSA records have reflected an operation nowhere close to the 1,300 trucks listed in the Hankook application. Its current public carrier profile reflects one power unit and one driver, while historical records reviewed during the investigation have likewise shown an operation dramatically smaller than the fleet represented to Hankook.

That discrepancy requires careful handling because federal motor-carrier reporting rules do not necessarily require every truck owned by a corporate family to appear under one DOT number.

A company can own tractors and lease them to other motor carriers. A holding or leasing company can own equipment operated under separately registered carrier authorities. Affiliated corporations can also maintain legitimate separation between equipment ownership and motor-carrier operations.

Therefore, a 1,300-truck commercial fleet representation does not automatically establish that Floyd’s MCS-150 should have reported 1,300 power units.

The central federal question is what Floyd actually operated or controlled as part of Floyd’s own motor-carrier operation.

The potential FMCSA reporting issue

Federal motor-carrier identification regulations require carriers to provide identifying and operational information to FMCSA through the MCS-150 and periodically update that information.

Federal regulations expressly provide that furnishing misleading information or making false statements on an MCS-150 can result in penalties.

That creates a second, completely separate potential legal issue from the Hankook application.

If Floyd legitimately owned equipment that was leased to separately registered Super Ego-affiliated carriers, the smaller FMCSA number may have a valid explanation even if the larger commercial fleet description was accurate.

But if Floyd actually operated or controlled substantially more equipment within its own motor-carrier operation than was disclosed to FMCSA, and investigators could establish that the smaller representation was knowingly false or misleading, federal regulatory penalties could become relevant.

Depending on the facts, knowingly and willfully making materially false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of a federal agency can also create broader federal false-statement issues.

TWOSU News has not obtained evidence establishing that Mimic personally filed a false MCS-150, ordered somebody else to file one or intentionally concealed equipment from FMCSA.

The documents currently create an investigative question, not proof of a federal crime.

One fleet, two audiences

Viewed together, the Hankook application and FMCSA records create an unusual factual problem.

If the 1,300-truck representation to Hankook was truthful, investigators need to determine exactly what relationship Floyd had to those trucks.

If Floyd itself operated them, the next question becomes whether its federal filings accurately reflected that operation.

If Floyd didnt operate them but legitimately represented affiliated companies commercially, then the records could provide evidence that Floyd acted as a centralized financial or purchasing entity for a much larger Super Ego network.

And if Floyd neither owned, controlled nor possessed authority to represent the trucks, then investigators could focus on whether the commercial fleet representation itself was materially false.

The important point is that the same equipment cannot simply be treated as Floyd’s commercial fleet when the scale of the operation provides purchasing or credit advantages while simultaneously having no documented relationship to Floyd when regulators examine the motor-carrier operation.

There may be a legitimate legal and corporate structure explaining both representations.

But the records should be capable of showing it.

Mimic’s ownership acknowledgement connects the companies

The relationship between Floyd and Super Ego becomes more important because Aleksandar Mimic has acknowledged in deposition testimony reviewed by TWOSU News that he owns both Floyd Inc. and Super Ego.

The Hankook application separately identifies him as Floyd’s President, CEO and owner.

Common ownership by itself is neither illegal nor unusual. Entrepreneurs routinely operate multiple corporations and subsidiaries.

The significance lies in the operational relationships between those companies.

If Floyd was using the combined fleet or purchasing power of Super Ego-affiliated entities while applying for commercial credit, common ownership could help explain why Floyd possessed authority to represent that larger fleet.

At the same time, that relationship could support further examination of how separate the entities actually were in areas such as purchasing, equipment, dispatch, management, finances, safety oversight and driver operations.

Federal lawsuits add another layer

Floyd, Super Ego and Mimic have also appeared together in federal litigation.

In litigation in the Northern District of Illinois, plaintiffs have named Super Ego Holding, Floyd Inc., Kordun Express, Rocket Expediting, Jordan Holdings, Rex Trucking, Mimic and others while alleging interconnected business relationships involving equipment, drivers and trucking operations.

Those claims remain allegations unless established through evidence or adjudication.

A separate federal case filed in Ohio in 2026 likewise names a larger collection of Super Ego-related entities, including Super Ego Holding, Super Ego Logistics, Super Ego Dispatch, Floyd Inc., MN89, Rocket Expediting and others.

Again, merely appearing together in a lawsuit does not legally merge separate companies into one corporation.

But when common ownership, litigation, fleet purchasing documents and numerous affiliated motor carriers are examined collectively, treating every entity as if it operated in complete isolation can produce an incomplete picture of the overall enterprise.

Why fragmented carrier networks matter

The American trucking industry contains thousands of legitimate corporate structures involving multiple DOT numbers, subsidiaries, equipment-leasing companies and operating carriers.

There are many lawful reasons to structure a transportation company that way.

The regulatory problem begins when fragmentation makes it difficult to identify where actual control resides.

A crash may appear under one carrier while an inspection appears under another. A driver may sign an agreement with one company while driving equipment owned by another. Dispatch may be handled by another entity, insurance may identify a different company and purchasing may be centralized somewhere else entirely.

When viewed individually, each motor carrier may appear relatively small.

When viewed collectively, however, the network can represent hundreds or thousands of trucks.

That distinction matters to regulators, drivers, creditors and litigants because corporate separation can determine who bears responsibility for safety, wages, debts, contracts and regulatory compliance.

The Hankook documents raise a “big when useful, small when separate” question

The central concern raised by the Hankook paperwork is whether the Super Ego network can present the combined scale of its affiliated companies when that size provides a commercial advantage while relying upon individual corporate identities when regulators or other parties examine a particular motor carrier.

A network of 1,300 trucks possesses considerable commercial leverage. Tire manufacturers, fuel providers, lenders, equipment vendors and other suppliers may compete aggressively for that volume.

A one-truck motor carrier possesses almost none of that purchasing leverage.

There is nothing inherently unlawful about a group of affiliated companies combining purchasing power. Major transportation corporations do it every day.

The critical issue is accurate disclosure.

If Floyd legitimately represented a 1,300-truck affiliated network, the participant agreements, ownership records, leases and related documents should support that representation.

If Floyd owned the trucks but leased them to other carriers, titles and leases should establish that relationship.

If the 1,300-truck figure cannot be tied to equipment Floyd owned, operated, controlled or was authorized to represent, its inclusion on a credit application becomes considerably more difficult to explain.

The documents underwent technical examination

TWOSU News conducted a technical examination of the Hankook credit application and accompanying National Fleet Account Agreement.

Together, the two native PDF files contain seven scanned pages. Embedded metadata indicates both documents were created on June 6, 2024 using the same ScanSnap iX1600 configuration, the same software version, the same PDF engine and the same 200-DPI scanning settings.

The creation times were separated by only six minutes and 28 seconds.

No obvious post-scan PDF overlays, incremental digital revisions or localized digital fabrication were identified during the examination.

The files therefore appear technically consistent with related documents produced during the same scanning session.

The paperwork also contains handwritten marks associated with Mimic’s name, although TWOSU News does not possess an independently authenticated handwriting exemplar sufficient to conclusively determine who physically placed each signature on the pages.

That distinction matters. The technical review strengthens the conclusion that the documents form a related contemporaneous business packet, but it does not independently prove the truth of every representation entered onto the forms or conclusively authenticate every signature.

Hankook’s underwriting file may contain the most important missing evidence

The most important unanswered questions may now sit inside Hankook’s own records.

TWOSU News has not established whether Hankook approved Floyd’s application, activated the proposed national fleet account, extended the requested $50,000 credit line or sold goods under the requested terms.

Those facts matter greatly when evaluating any potential criminal theory.

Hankook’s internal underwriting file could show whether the fleet size was actually considered, whether the company independently verified it, whether financial statements were supplied and whether the projected purchasing volume influenced the credit decision.

Internal account notes could reveal whether underwriters understood Floyd to be a 1,300-truck carrier or whether Hankook knew from the beginning that the number represented a larger affiliated Super Ego fleet.

Credit approval records could show whether the requested line was approved, reduced or rejected.

Invoices and account statements could establish whether Hankook ultimately provided merchandise, pricing or other commercial benefits.

And the missing Participants Addendum could establish exactly which other companies Floyd claimed authority to represent.

Those records could substantially weaken the potential deception theory by providing a legitimate explanation, or they could make the discrepancy significantly more serious.

What prosecutors would actually have to prove

The distance between a troubling document and a criminal case is substantial.

For a creditor-deception theory, investigators would generally need evidence establishing that the fleet representation was materially false, that the person responsible knew it was false and that the statement was intended to influence Hankook’s financial decision or obtain an economic benefit.

For Illinois deceptive-practices or theft theories, prosecutors would need to establish the statutory elements involving deception, intent and, depending upon the specific offense, a resulting financial obligation or property obtained.

For federal mail or wire fraud, prosecutors would additionally need evidence of a deliberate scheme to defraud and use of interstate mail or electronic communications in furtherance of that scheme.

For the FMCSA side, investigators would need to determine what Floyd was legally required to report and whether a federal filing itself contained information that was knowingly false or misleading.

None of those elements can simply be assumed from the difference between 1,300 trucks on one document and a much smaller number on another.

But that does not make the discrepancy insignificant.

It provides investigators with a specific representation, an identifiable potential financial benefit and a set of records capable of proving or disproving the competing explanations.

Duffy’s announcement changes why these questions matter

The timing of the Hankook findings is especially significant because Duffy’s announcement shows federal investigators are increasingly looking behind individual drivers and toward the companies operating around them.

Federal authorities have publicly identified unauthorized employment, identity fraud, document fraud, financial crime, labor exploitation and shell-company activity as areas of concern in trucking.

The government has also disclosed programs including Operation ICE Wall, Operation Guardrail and Operation Freightliner, all intended in different ways to identify unlawful commercial driving activity and the businesses surrounding it.

There is no public evidence that Super Ego or Floyd is a target of those particular programs.

But the government’s broader direction is unmistakable.

Federal investigators increasingly want to know who actually owns the equipment, who dispatches the truck, who controls the carrier, where the money goes and whether the legal entities shown on paper accurately reflect the economic reality of the operation.

Those are the same questions raised by the Floyd and Super Ego records.

The records that could resolve the discrepancy

The underlying mystery is ultimately capable of being solved with documentation.

Floyd’s historical MCS-150 filing in effect around June 6, 2024 would establish what the company represented to FMCSA when the Hankook application was created.

Vehicle titles and equipment schedules could establish what Floyd actually owned.

Intercompany leases could determine whether Floyd-owned trucks were being operated under other Super Ego-affiliated carrier authorities.

Insurance schedules could identify individual equipment, named insureds and the carriers actually operating those vehicles.

The missing Hankook Participants Addendum could identify the affiliated companies Floyd claimed authority to represent.

Hankook’s underwriting file could establish whether the fleet representation mattered to its credit decision.

And email or transmission records could establish who sent the application, how it was transmitted and whether interstate communications were involved.

Those records are capable of turning the current discrepancy into either a straightforward corporate explanation or evidence of something much more serious.

A potential criminal theory, but not yet proof of a crime

TWOSU News is not reporting that Aleksandar Mimic, Floyd Inc. or Super Ego committed fraud, theft, federal wire fraud or a false-statement offense.

The evidence currently available does not establish criminal intent, creditor reliance or the complete ownership and operating history of the 1,300 trucks represented in the application.

What the evidence does establish is that a Mimic-controlled company sought commercial credit and national fleet benefits while representing 1,300 trucks and 1,300 trailers, projected $120,000 in annual purchasing and requested a $50,000 credit line.

The same company’s individual federal motor-carrier profile has reflected a dramatically smaller operation.

Mimic has acknowledged owning both Floyd and Super Ego, placing the relationship between those businesses squarely at the center of the explanation.

If the 1,300 trucks represented a legitimate affiliated fleet, supporting records should establish that.

If Floyd owned those trucks but leased them elsewhere, supporting records should establish that as well.

If Floyd actually operated or controlled substantially more equipment than its federal reporting reflected, FMCSA would have reason to examine whether those filings were accurate.

And if the fleet number was knowingly inflated in order to change Hankook’s underwriting assessment and obtain credit, pricing, merchandise or other financial benefits, investigators could potentially examine state deception laws and, depending upon how the application was transmitted and what intent could be proven, federal mail or wire fraud statutes.

That is what makes the Hankook application important.

It places a potentially material representation at the exact point where information supplied by a company can influence another company’s decision to put money and property at risk.

The larger Super Ego question

The broader story is not really about tires.

It is about understanding how the Super Ego network functions when the corporate paperwork is examined as a whole.

If its companies are genuinely independent, their equipment, financial and operational records should reflect meaningful separation.

If the companies operate collectively through common ownership, centralized purchasing, shared equipment, dispatch, management, finances or other functions, that relationship should become increasingly visible as records are examined together.

Mimic’s acknowledged ownership of Floyd and Super Ego is one part of that picture. The federal lawsuits involving multiple related entities are another. The Hankook credit application may now be one of the clearest pieces because it puts an actual fleet number onto paper in a financial transaction.

The central question is therefore not simply whether Floyd reported one truck, 19 trucks or 1,300 trucks.

The question is where the 1,300 trucks came from, what legal relationship Floyd had to them and whether Hankook and the federal government were each given an accurate description of that relationship.

There may be a legitimate explanation for every part of it.

If there is, the leases, titles, participant agreements, federal filings and underwriting records should show it.

If there isnt, the discrepancy moves from an unusual trucking-company accounting question into something federal and state investigators could have much greater reason to examine.

And as Washington begins looking beyond the driver and deeper into the companies, finances and corporate structures behind America’s trucking industry, that question surrounding Super Ego may be becoming more important by the day.

Mimic responds through Alpha Advisory

Before publication, TWOSU News contacted Aleksandar Mimic and provided an opportunity to respond to the findings and questions raised by the Hankook documents, Floyd Inc.’s federal motor-carrier records and the relationship between Floyd and the larger Super Ego network.

A response was subsequently provided through Alpha Advisory. In that response, Floyd was characterized as a leasing company that continues to maintain operating authority but, according to the statement, “does not and has not operated as a carrier for many years.”

That position is significant because it directly addresses one of the central questions raised by this investigation, but it does not resolve the fleet discrepancy. If Floyd was functioning primarily as a leasing company in 2024, the 1,300 trucks and 1,300 trailers represented on its Hankook fleet profile would appear to describe either equipment owned by Floyd, equipment leased through Floyd, equipment belonging to affiliated companies that Floyd was authorized to represent, or some combination of those categories.

The response did not identify which of those explanations applies. It also did not identify the vehicles included in the 1,300-truck figure, explain whether those trucks were owned by Floyd, Super Ego or other affiliated entities, or identify the additional “Participants” contemplated by the Hankook National Fleet Account Agreement.

Floyd’s statement that it has not operated as a carrier for many years also requires additional explanation because current FMCSA records continue to identify Floyd Inc., USDOT 2903977, as an active motor carrier with active property-carrier authority. Federal safety records also reflect recent roadside inspection activity attributed to Floyd during the most recent 24-month reporting period.

Those records do not necessarily prove that Floyd was operating a conventional trucking fleet during that period. There could be an explanation involving leased equipment, another party operating under Floyd’s authority, or another contractual arrangement. Alpha Advisory was asked to explain that apparent conflict so Floyd’s position could be accurately reflected.

The response also raised concerns about the publication of personally identifiable information contained in the Hankook documents. TWOSU News redacted nonessential direct contact information, unique business identifiers, handwritten signatures and other sensitive information before preparing any document images for publication. The portions being published are limited to information directly relevant to the reporting, including the company name, Mimic’s corporate title, the requested $50,000 credit line, projected annual purchases, fleet figures and relevant National Fleet Account provisions.

TWOSU News also clarified that the Hankook documents were provided to the newsroom unsolicited by a source. TWOSU News did not request, direct, encourage, participate in or assist with their acquisition. The newsroom does not know whether the source’s disclosure may have violated an internal company policy or private obligation, but TWOSU News did not instruct anyone to access, copy or remove the documents.

Importantly, the response provided through Alpha Advisory did not dispute the authenticity of the Hankook credit application or the accompanying National Fleet Account Agreement. No claim was made that the documents were fabricated, altered or falsely attributed to Floyd. That is significant because TWOSU News independently conducted a technical examination of the native PDF files and found them consistent with related documents scanned on June 6, 2024 during the same scanning session.

The fact that the authenticity of the documents was not challenged does not, by itself, establish that every representation contained in them was accurate or that Hankook approved the application. It does, however, narrow the dispute. The central questions now concern what the 1,300-truck figure actually represented, who owned or controlled those vehicles, what authority Floyd had to represent them, and whether the fleet information was material to the commercial relationship being sought.

Alpha Advisory was also asked several direct follow-up questions, including whether Floyd owned the 1,300 trucks and 1,300 trailers represented to Hankook, which companies were intended to participate under the National Fleet Account Agreement, whether Floyd had written authority to represent affiliated equipment, whether Hankook understood the fleet figure to represent a broader corporate network, and whether the requested $50,000 credit line or other National Fleet Account benefits were ultimately approved.

At the time this section was prepared, those questions remained unanswered.

TWOSU News will update this report if Mimic, Floyd Inc., Super Ego or their authorized representatives provide additional documentation or a substantive response that materially clarifies the ownership, control or representation of the fleet described in the Hankook application.